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Public lands in Southern and Central Appalachia (SCA) available for outdoor recreational 
pursuits are limited relative to the rest of the county. This study identifies factors that encourage 
private land owners to permit public access to their land for recreational purposes and determines 
how much acreage would be offered in the Southern and Central Appalachia region. The Tobit 
and Heckman’s sample selection models suggest that the probability of offering land to the 
public is correlated with the number of acres offered. Having acreage suited for recreation is a 
positive determinant of acres leased but attributes developed by the landowner act as a 
disincentive. Type of recreational activity has no effect on the landowner’s decision and the 
supply of recreational acreage is inelastic with respect to price. 
 
Keywords: private land lease, recreational activities, Tobit model, Heckman’s sample selection 
model, public recreational use 
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Land area suitable for recreational use in Southern and Central Appalachia (SCA) has increased 
over the past fifty years – forested acres grew from 60-82% of land cover, resulting from a 
decline in agricultural use and shrinking urban areas (Wear and Bolstad, 1998).
1 However, the 
growth occurred primarily on privately-owned property that was not accessible to the general 
population.
2 Public land holdings, which support most of the outdoor recreational activities in the 
U.S., did not change perceptibly nor did the distribution of land cover on those lands. 
 
The demand for outdoor recreational activities has exploded in recent years. Cordel et.al. (1999) 
report a continuously increasing demand within a three-fold increase in national demand for 
outdoor recreation between the years of 1962 and 1983. This growth is attributed to both an 
increase in the number of outdoor recreationists and an increase in outdoor recreational activities. 
A growing demand and a fixed supply of recreational land can lead to conflicts among 
recreationists and crowded outdoor recreation sites. Congestion and conflict, in turn, can lead to 
diminished utility from recreational activities and may result in fewer recreation trips on average 
(Stewart and Cole, 2001; Manning and Valliere, 2001). 
 
In the SCA region, far more potential recreation land (PRL) area is privately owned than is true 
in any other region of the U.S. Across the U.S. there are, on average, 987 persons/ km
2 of PRL 
while in the SCA region there are 2,720 persons/ km
2, and in the Non-SCA region there are 958   3 
persons/ km
2. In other words, the availability of PRL land on a per capita basis in the SCA region 
is about one third less than the availability of PRL land on a per capita basis outside this region.  
 
If public and private lands that are currently open to the public in SCA do not supply sufficient 
acreage to provide the level of outdoor recreational pursuits, and there are no plans to increase 
public holdings, then additional privately held lands must be considered to meet the shortfall. --
Several attributes have been found to be important in determining lease value for hunting. In 
Louisiana, variables significant in explaining lease price for deer hunting were the number of 
acres per hunter and the perceived quality that area’s biological habitat for hunting (Messouier 
and Luzar, 1990). Hunting decisions have been also analyzed in Coronado, California (Creel and 
Loomis, 1990). 
 
One would expect that a shortage of suitable public land would provide an incentive for 
recreationists to pay a fee for access to privately held land. This, then, begs two questions: “Are 
landowners willing to open their land to the public?” and “At what fee would private land 
owners in SCA be willing to permit access to their land and how much land would be made 
available for recreational pursuits?” Neither one of these questions have been addressed before. 
Many factors beyond the access fee influence this decision, including costs of maintaining the 
land for recreational purposes, development and liability costs, opportunity costs of the land, and 
constraining demographic factors.
3  Furthermore, many landowners use their land for their own 
recreation as well as that of their family and friends.  
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The data used in this investigation are from the National Private Land Ownership Survey 
(NPLOS). NPLOS was a joint effort between the USDA’s National Resource Conservation 
Service, the U.S. Forest Service Southeastern Experiment Station, and the University of Georgia. 
In it, data were collected from a national sample (excluding Hawaii and Alaska) of owners of 
rural tracts of land exceeding 4 hectares (10 acres).  
 
Although the data was collected in 1996, no analysis was made from this data. Furthermore, no 
previous analyses address the supply of land by private landowners for recreational purpose. In 
this study, we identify several factors that would influence private land owners to offer their land 
to the public for recreational purposes. This decision depends in part on the suitability of land for 
recreation. Their perceived net benefit from using the land for their own needs versus offering 
land to the public affects the landowner’s decision. The amount of land offered for different 
recreational purposes will also have to be consistent with present uses of that land (i.e., crops and 
livestock). Thus, the size of the tract of land offered by the landowner for recreational purposes 
is whatever acreage is suitable for specific recreational purposes and at the same time represents 
a minimal opportunity cost of forgoing agricultural uses.  
 
In this analysis, the factors explaining the private landowner’s choice of acreage they are willing 
to offer to the public for recreational activities are identified and a determination is made as to  
whether the decisions to open and how much acreage to offer are two distinct decisions or not. 
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Theoretical Development 
The private landowner must decide whether or not to offer acreage for recreational purposes for 
a fee (BID) and how much to offer (a dichotomous choice decision).  
 
The landowner offers or leases acreage (AcL) by utilizing acreage that is suited to recreational 
purposes (AcS). Some of this suitable acreage AcS may or may not be currently used to generate 
income (AcOther uses) and some can be from converted acreage devoted to agricultural production 
(AcAgr) (Equation 1). Other uses of land include forested land and land used for their own 
recreational purposes: 
AcL ≤ AcS = AcAgr + AcOther uses               (1)   
Acres suitable for recreational use have attributes that may include the presence of native 
vegetative cover, topography, caves, scenic vistas, and streams or rivers.  
 
The private landowner will choose to lease acreage if leasing earns a profit (πL). However, the 
profit earned from leasing must exceed the average opportunity cost (AOC) from employing the 
land in agricultural uses and the benefits (net of agricultural opportunity cost) that the land owner 
receives from enjoying that land for recreational activities for themselves, their family and 
friends. Landowners must weigh the value of the benefits received for keeping the public off 
their land (B) versus the net returns they will receive (πL ) from offering acreage for recreational 
purposes to the public.  
 
Thus it follows that the private landowner will lease land if πL is positive and exceeds the 
benefits received from keeping the land for himself, family or friends. In Equation 2, L   6 
represents the private landowner’s choice to lease given πL > B and not to lease given πL ≤ B. A 
unique set of socio-economic and demographic variables describe the landowner (Z). In the case 
where L = 1 the landowner has chosen to open land because the resulted
*
L π exceeds some 
positive benefit B. In the case where L = 0 the landowner has chosen to not open land 
because
*




L π > B], Z} = 1 and L ~ {[
*
L π  ≤ B], Z} = 0          (2)  
 
It is assumed that the private landowner only has a fixed amount (AcS) of acreage with suitable 
attributes that can be leased and that the private landowner is unable to acquire additional 
suitable acres in the short run. The problem faced by the landowner is to choose AcL to 
maximize (πL – B) given recreational attributes of suitable acreage (AcS), AOC, BID and Z.  
                    
Empirical Models 
Since the dependent variable is censored from below (number of acres≥0), a Tobit model can be 
used. Suppose the actual observed acreage offered by respondent ican be denoted as i Y . It is only 





> + = =
≤ =
0 * when *
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          (3) 
where  i X  are the explanatory variables; β is a vector of unknown coefficient to be estimated; 
and i ε  is a normal distributed iid noise such that ( )
2 , 0 ~ ε σ ε N i  with unknown variance
2
ε σ to be 
estimated. The Tobit model does not differentiate the two decision stages (whether or not and 
how much). The Heckman’s selection model relaxes this restriction.  
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If we use W = 1 to denote those individuals who would like to open their land and W = 0 
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i            (4) 
where  i W * is a latent variable similarly defined as i Y *but can be explained by a set of factors 
in i Z . γ represents the vector of coefficients to be estimated and i e is another iid normally 
distributed term: ( )
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          (5) 
Notice that i Z and i X could contain different variables. We define the first expression in (5) as the 
participation equation and second expression as the level equation.  
 
The Heckman model assumed a bivariate normal distribution for i ε and i e in the form of 
[ ] [ ] ρ σ ε , 1 , , 0 , 0 ~ ,
2 BN ei i . In this expression, the variance of the error term in the participation 
equation is normalized to 1 leaving the variance of the level equation
2 σ and correlation 
factorρ to be estimated.  
 
For any regressor that is common to both i Z and i X , the marginal effect is:  





γ λ γ λ ρσ β ε ) (
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          (6) 
where  ( )







λi . It is straightforward to see that marginal effects include two components: 
the direct effect is represented by k β , which is also the effect of those variables only appear in i X ;   8 
and the indirect effect takes the form of the second term at the right hand side in (6), which is the 
effect of those variables only appear in  i Z . For a dummy variable, no differentiation can be 
taken. Differences in predicted dependent variables when the dummy variable is 1 or 0 
respectively are taken as the marginal effects. Transforming the marginal effects into elasticities 
is straightforward.  
 
The estimation of the Tobit model provides the basis for model specification tests. A Lagrangian 
Multiplier test can be conducted to test between the Tobit versus the Heckman models (Lin and 
Schmidt, 1984).  
 
Data and Variables for the Analysis 
The sample contains 408 landowners with complete data, who controlled 163.48 km
2 (40,398 
acres), or approximately 0.10%, of non-PRL. Of this acreage, 25% (4,024 km
2 or 9,944 acres) 
were opened to friends and family for recreational purposes, 2% (303 km
2 or 748 acres) were 
opened to the public for a fee, and 18% (2,883 km
2 or 7,124 acres) were opened to family, 
friends and the public without a fee. The remaining acreage (45%) was not opened for 
recreational purposes.  
 
Through a series of questions, the survey established that landowners who were leasing land to 
the public did not have multiple leases but a single lease each. Almost all the leases were to 
individuals. On average, the annual number of visits by people leasing land was 7.5. The NPLOS 
questionnaire asked “If an individual or group were interested in leasing additional acres just for 
hunting and/or fishing” or for “camping, hiking, walking, or some use other than hunting or   9 
fishing”, and “they offered you $(X) per acre, per year, would you be willing to sign a lease 
granting them and their guests access in the upcoming 12 months, with the stipulation that they 
would care for the land and not damage roads, fences, or other improvements?” The (X) was 
randomly selected values between $2 and $20 and the stated amounts were recorded as BID. 
Note that, although the questionnaire differentiated between hunting and (or) fishing (lethal) 
recreational activities versus camping, hiking, walking, etc. (non-lethal) recreational activities, 
the bids given for these recreational activities were the same. The average offered bid for those 
that opened land to the public was $11.16 versus $8.07 for those that did not. 
 
The response to the offered bid, either yes (1) or no (0) was then recorded. If the respondent 
answered “yes,” the next question was “how many additional acres would you be willing to lease 
at the above dollar amount?” The open-ended responses were recorded as AcL.  
 
Acreage suitable for recreational activities (AcS), is calculated from the. NPLOS survey which 
reports the acreage that is currently opened (i.e., is currently suitable) for recreational access. The 
sum of acreage with access to only friends and family, acreage with access to those who pay to 
lease, and acreage with access to the public is used as a proxy measure of AcS. This sum 
represents the minimum acreage potentially suitable for recreational access at the time of the 
NPLOS survey.  
 
Much of the acreage in SCA, being steep and timbered, is unsuited for crop production unless it 
is “bottom ground.” Thus, SCA acreage is not generally associated with the high opportunity   10 
cost crops like tobacco, corn, and soybeans. The average opportunity cost (AOC) for the 408 
surveyed SCA landowners is $21.25 per acre ($8.60 per ha).
5  
 
To examine land attributes, we defined 5 indices that range of from 0-100 and contain attributes 
of the individual land holder level that were featured in the survey: Property Attributes Index 
(PATTI); Surrounding Property Attributes Index (SATTI); Index of Property Attributes that 
Detract from Recreational Development (DETRAC); Developed Attributes Index (DEVI); and 
Index of Property Attributes that could be Naturally Occurring or Developed (NDATTI).  
 
The index PATTI includes naturally occurring attributes like topography, presence of streams or 
rivers, and native vegetation and wildlife that occur on the landowner’s property. The index 
SATTI is like PATTI except that the naturally occurring attributes are on adjacent property. 
However, some attributes that might be naturally occurring like ponds, lakes, wildlife, and 
timber can be developed as well. These attributes, where it is hard to distinguish if they are 
naturally occurring or developed, are included in the index NDATTI. Developed attributes 
included in the index DEVI include anything that the landowner engages time and (or) money in 
to change the natural condition of the land such as a dam on a stream to form a pond or lake, 
management of naturally occurring vegetation to attract more wildlife, the introduction of 
wildlife to enhance the native population, and (or) the construction of trails or other structures to 
improve the recreational value of the property.  
 
The index DETRAC includes attributes that take away from the recreational experience of the 
acreage including a residence on the property, proximity to a residential development, or the   11 
presence of livestock on the acreage (Table 1). The average respondent was 58 years old and 
white (92%) with a high school education and some college education (13 years). Majority of the 
land owners in the sample were male and the average household annual income was about 
$50,000. Slightly more than half of the land owners would consider open their land for hunting.  
 
Estimation Results 
Table 2 presents the baseline Tobit model estimation and Table 3 presents the estimation results 
of the Sample Selection Model. The Tobit model shows that there exist several significant 
factors affecting the decision to lease acreage: the lease price (BID); suitable acreage for 
recreational activities (AcS); some specific property attributes for recreational use (such as 
wildlife, ponds, timber etc.) and some demographic variables. The Lagrangian Multiplier test 
strongly rejects the Tobit model and favors the Heckman model specification. Thus we conclude 
that the resulting estimation favors the hurdle in representing the decision process of landowners: 
they decide whether to open land to the public for recreational use and how many acres to offer 
for that purpose. Since the sample selection model is superior to the Tobit model, we focus the 
discussion on the former.  
 
Table 3 presents the results of the estimation of the Heckman model. Demographic variables 
were introduced in the participation equation and gave similar results with the Tobit estimation, 
but were not included in the level equation. This was based on the assumption that individual 
characteristic variables such as the demographic information may affect the decision on whether 
to open the land. Characteristics of the land rather than land owners would play more direct roles   12 
in determining how much land to open. The inverse mill ratio λ is significant at 1% level, 
suggesting that selection bias exist and the two-stage approach recognizes this bias. 
 
The results show that the offered price for leasing (BID), the availability of suitable acreage for 
recreational purpose (AcS) and attributes that are naturally occurring on the landowner’s property 
(NDATTI) are important determinants on both of the decision to lease land and the acreage they 
would lease. With higher leasing price (BID), landowners are more likely to lease the land to the 
public, and lease more acreage as well. Naturally, AcS has a positive impact on both decisions 
meaning that more acreage suitable for recreational purposes will improve both the likelihood of 
opening land and the amount of land to be opened. The decision to lease and how much acreage 
to lease are also based on the recreational characteristics of the landowner’s parcel of land. The 
attributes that favor recreational use and provide an incentive in leasing land to the public and 
leasing more acreages tent to be naturally occurring on the landowner’s property (NDATTI), 
such as ponds, timber, wildlife etc. Finally, the variable DEVI is marginally significant in the 
level equation indicating that if private land owners have implemented land improvements to 
their property, they will be less likely to open their land to the public for recreational purposes.  
 
Agricultural average opportunity cost (AOC) does not have a significant effect in the 
landowner’s decision to lease land, neither does the type of recreational activity (hunting, fishing, 
camping, etc) for which the land will be leased. It is interesting that those characteristics that 
could be considered as not favoring recreational activities (proximity to populated areas, 
livestock, etc or variable DETRACT) have no statistically significant effect on the landowner   13 
decisions. Characteristics of surrounding land to the landowner’s property (SATTI) do not affect 
the decision to lease either.  
 
Landowners with more years of education (EDUY) and landowners with higher income 
(INCOME) are more likely to open land to the public whereas white landowners (WHITE) are 
less likely to allow public access for a fee for recreational activities on their land. 
 
Complete calculation of the elasticities of different variables to the leasing behavior will need to 
consider both direct impact (from the level equation) and indirect impact (from the participation 
equation). However, the calculated elasticities using this approach are not realistic (they varies 
excessively across variables), and as a result, only the level equation coefficients will be 
interpreted. The variables shown in the level equation are conditional on opening the land for 
recreation but do not include the indirect effects from the variables shown in the participation 
equation (Table 3).  
 
Table 4 provides estimates of the elasticities for the amount of leased land with respect to the 
significant variables in the level equation. The calculated point elasticity of the supply curve 
measured at the mean for BID is 0.50 (i.e., inelastic). The intercept for the level equation is 
significantly different from 0 as are the parameter estimates for AcS, BID, NDATTI and DEVI. 
Results show that a 1 acre (0.40 ha) increase in AcS (suitable acreage) will increase AcL (offered 
acreage) by 0.74 acres (0.31 ha). When acreage is better suited for recreational activities, by 
virtue of having certain attributes (i.e., ponds, lakes, timber, and wildlife) that could be the 
naturally occurring attributes or developed by the land owner, there is incentive for landowners   14 
to lease more acreage. In this case increasing NDATTI by 1 unit, increases leased acreage AcL 
by 0.52 acres (1.43 ha).  
 
The variable DEVI is marginally significant in the decision of how many acres to open for public 
recreation. Thus, it appears that fewer acres are offered to public when the landowner has 
developed certain attributes for recreation on their land, probably preferring to enjoy some of 
them with their family and friends. Increasing the index suggested by DEVI by 1 unit, the 
suggested leased acreage will decrease by 0.34 acres (0.14 ha).  
 
It appears that landowners in SCA are reluctant to open additional acreage to the public at going 
rental rates. From these results we conclude that the supply of private acreage for public 
recreational use is inelastic because there are few substitutes for suitable acreage. Increases in the 
availability of recreationally suitable land may yield relatively small acreage for public use for a 
fee because of the inelasticity in price and the general reluctance of landowners to open acreage 
to the public. Increasing recreational attributes suitable for recreational use can be achieved by 
conservation programs, many of which are already in place such as set-aside acres, conservation 
reserve program, wetlands preservation, riparian habitat restoration, conservation districts, 
purchase of development rights, enhancement of ecosystem services, etc. In all, however, it 
appears that, given the small elasticities obtained in this study, recreationists in SCA are destined 
to higher concentration on an acre of PRL relative to the rest of the country and higher fees.  
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Conclusions 
This study identified the factors that would lead private land owners to open their acreage to the 
public for recreational purposes and determine how much acreage these landowners actually 
open to the public. Better suited land for recreational activities especially when certain attributes 
are present (ponds, lakes, timber wildlife etc.), provides some incentive to offer recreational land 
to the public. An interesting finding of this study is that “type” of recreational activity is not 
important in terms of private acreage opened for a fee. Two types of recreational activity were 
investigated, lethal or consumptive (hunting and/or fishing) and non-lethal or non-consumptive 
(hiking, backpacking, swimming, bird watching, etc.). 
 
It appears that landowners in SCA are reluctant to open acreage to the public at going rates and 
that any naturally occurring or developed recreational attributes are enjoyed by the landowners, 
their family, and friends. Developing additional recreational attributes contribute to the decision 
to open acreage, but the contribution is small. The landowner is not willing to offer much 
additional acreage at sequentially higher prices even if these prices are higher than his/her 
agricultural opportunity costs. 
 
To increase the area available for recreational activities in SCA, thus reducing the concentration 
of persons on an acre of potential recreational land, policy makers must either increase public 
land or rely on the only other source of suitable and available recreational land; that is land held 
by private landowners. Given the small elasticities obtained in this study, people in SCA will 
likely continue to see increased competition for recreational land. Private groups may purchase 
and use land for recreation at higher cost.   16 
Footnotes 
1.  South Central Appalachia (SCA) is a much larger area than is the area represented by the 
counties of the Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC) that are in SCA. The ARC is a 
federal designation that includes only severely impoverished or otherwise resource limited 
counties (ARC, 2009). Counties from the states of Alabama (35 counties), Georgia (37 
counties), Kentucky (51 counties), Mississippi (24 counties), North Carolina (29 counties), 
Tennessee (50 counties), South Carolina (5 counties), Virginia (14 cities and 17 counties), 
and West Virginia (9 counties) are included in this study. (Appalachian Regional 
Commission).  
2.  The SCA region comprises 3.3% (324,279 km
2) of the total U.S. land area of 9,826,630 km
2. 
Only 10.03% of the SCA region (32,525 km
2) is potential recreation land (PRL) meaning that 
it meets all three of the following criteria: 1) designated as protected areas; 2) owned by the 
federal, state, or local governments; and 3) not designated for use by the military. In contrast, 
20.09% of the entire U.S. land area (1974170 km
2) and 20.44% of the non-SCA land area 
(1942281 km
2) is PRL. Of the PRL owned by the federal, state, or local governments, 
78.69% (25,594 km
2) is under federal ownership (with U.S. Forest Service owning 72.3%, or 
23515.6926 km
2, of the federal land holdings), 20.75% is under state ownership (6,752 km
2) 
and 0.56% is owned by local governments (182 km
2). This data were determined using 
Geographic Information System data layers compiled by Dr. Roger Brown, University of 
Kentucky, Department of Agricultural Economics.  
3.   Previous studies have identified numerous ranch price influencing factors beyond 
agricultural income (Sengupta and Osgood, 2003; Sunderman et al., 2000). Torell et al. (2005) 
find that consumptive and quality-of-life influences on land value appear to have grown in   17 
economic important. They find that ranch values vary significantly and consistently with 
high value placed on ranch location in the mountains (scenic views) and with recreational 
opportunities.  
4.  Liability insurance does not vary within the SCA region. The issue of the importance of 
liability insurance and need for it has been discussed in Wright et al.  
5.  The survey identified 6 land types and asked landowners to indicate how many acres of each 
land type they owned. The 6 land types were defined to be “Forest or Wood Land,” “Range 
Land,” “Crop or Hay Land,” “Pasture Land,” “Other Land Being Farmed or Cultivated,” 
“Water Bodies,” and “Barren Land.” From the University of Kentucky, the University of 
Tennessee and Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University Extension Service, the 
following opportunity costs were determined for each category of acreage: $17.50 per acre 
($7.08 per ha) for Forest or Wood Land; $25.00 per acre ($10.12 per ha) for Range Land; 
$55.00 per acre ($22.26 per ha) for Crop and Hay Land; $25.00 per acre ($10.12 per ha) for 
Pasture Land; and $10.00 per acre ($4.05 per ha) for Other Land Being Farmed or Cultivated. 
Acres described as Water Bodies or Barren Land were determined to have no opportunity 
cost associated with them although there is some aquaculture in SCA and even freshly cut 
timber land, often described as “barren land,” has some return. AOC is the sum of the 
product of the opportunity cost and the acreage of the associated land type divided by the 
sum of the acreage of the associated land types. 
   18 
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 Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Variables Used in the Analysis  
 
Variable  Definition  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min.  Max. 
AcL  Number of Acres Leased 
   18.250  85.209  0.000  700.000 
OPEN  Dummy; =I if would like lease the land  0.076  0.265  0.000  1.000 
BID  Per Acre Price of Access 
   8.071  4.725  2.000  20.000 
AcS  Acreage Suitable for Public Access
   64.061  144.845  0.000  1400.000 
AOC  Per Acre Agricultural Average Opportunity 
Cost 
21.249  10.183  0.000  55.000 
PATTI  Property Attributes Index   49.118  19.758  0.000  100.000 
SATTI  Surrounding Acreage Attributes Index   27.328  20.900  0.000  100.000 
DEVI  Property Development Index 
   12.386  11.284  0.000  65.400 
NDATTI  Index of Property Attributes that could be 
Naturally Occurring or Developed
  
19.583  19.653  0.000  100.000 
DETRAC  Index of Property Attributes that Detract 
from Recreational Development 
16.014  11.818  0.000  45.500 
EDUY  Education Year   13.027  3.834  4.000  22.000 
AGE  Age of the Land Owner  57.956  12.818  27.000  97.000 
WHITE  Race: Caucasian = 1 (White)
   0.924  0.265  0.000  1.000 
MALE  Gender; = 1 if male   0.794  0.405  0.000  1.000 
INCOME  Annually income of the Land Owner 
(thousand dollars) 
50.067  38.377  2.500  175.000 
HUNT  Dummy; =1 if allow to do hunting in the 
open land 
0.525  0.500  0.000  1.000 
           
N=408                
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Table 2. Coefficient Estimates of the Tobit Model for Leased Acreage 
  
Variable  Coeff.  Std. Err. 
Constant  -1273.873***  351.939 
BID  17.569***  6.391 
AcS  0.914***  0.167 
AOC  3.622  3.395 
SATTI  -0.548  1.458 
NDATTI  3.132*  1.693 
PATTI  -1.793  2.058 
DEVI  -2.875  3.452 
DETRAC  1.333  2.863 
EDUY  23.489**  11.676 
AGE  4.645  2.899 
MALE  131.667  114.532 
WHITE  -272.455**  111.120 
INCOME  1.604*  0.894 
HUNT  -14.134  64.542 
     
Sigma (σ) (Std. dev)  308.463***  46.689 
Log likelihood (LL)  -270.199   
LM test [df]
1  33.993[ 15]   
 
*, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels respectively. 
 
1LM test: Critical value with 15 degrees of freedom is 25.00 (p=0.05). Since 33.993> 25.00, it 
means the Tobit model is rejected in favor of a hurdle model.  22 
Table 3. Estimation Results of the Sample Selection Model for Leased Acreage 
 
Participation Equation  Level Equation 
Y=OPEN  Y= AcL 
Variable  Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err. 
Constant  -3.867***  1.080  -560.296**  259.363 
BID  0.064**  0.021  10.777*  6.230 
AcS  0.003***  0.001  0.756***  0.167 
AOC  0.014  0.012  1.979  3.355 
PATTI  -0.005  0.007  1.168  1.884 
NDATTI  0.010*  0.006  3.529**  1.523 
SATTI  -0.002  0.005  -  - 
DEVI  -0.007  0.013  -4.569*  2.933 
DETRAC  0.007  0.010  2.643  2.887 
EDUY  0.098**  0.038  -  - 
AGE  0.008  0.010    - 
MALE  0.303  0.383  -  - 
WHITE  -1.206***  0.355  -  - 
INCOME  0.006*  0.003  -  - 
HUNT  -0.092  0.226  -  - 
         
 λ      234.528***  77.407 
ρ  1.000       
LL  -73.903       
  
*, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels respectively.   23 
Table 4. Elasticity of the Explanatory Variables for Leased Acreage 
 
Variable  Coeff.  Elasticity  
BID  10.777  0.501 
AcS  0.756  0.741 
NDATTI  3.529  0.521 
DEVI  -4.569  -0.337 
 
 